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The make up of the American labor force has changed dras-
tically in the last few years.1 The current trend of corporate
downsizing and cost-cutting has led to the increased use of "con-
tingent" or non-traditional workers whose schedules resemble
anything but the traditional nine-to-five. By the broadest defini-
tion, contingent employees which, by some estimates, constitute
one third of the entire workforce, 2 include individuals working
for temporary help agencies, independent contractors, part-time
employees, 3 and workers employed by the day.4 Because Ameri-
t J.D. Candidate, May 1997, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
The author would like to thank those who provided encouragement and comments on
this Article including- Professor James B. Atleson, Professor Alfred S. Konefsky, Caroline
Hooper and most importantly Nancy and Richard Tocha and Chris Sebastian.
1. See Scott F. Cooper, The Expanding Use of the Contingent Work Force in the
American Economy: New Opportunities and Dangers for Employers, 40 EmPL. REL. L.J.
525 (1995).
2. See Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges
and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 863, 867 (1995) (setting forth his oft-cited
current estimate of temporary, part-time and self-employed workers to be at twenty-five
to thirty percent of the work force). Recently, however, the United States Bureau of La-
bor Statistics released the first-ever survey on the contingent work force. The study esti-
mated that contingent workers comprised between two to five percent of the work force.
However, the study failed to include part-time and leased employees. See Pamela
Mendels, Temp Workers Want Permanence; Feds Issue First Study of 'Contingents" NEws-
DAY, Aug. 18, 1995, at A49.
3. The part-time segment of the work force alone increased from 10.8 million to 20.7
million between 1969 and 1993. See EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT RESEARCH INsT., CHARACTERIs-
TICS OF THE PART-TiME WORK FORCE: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1993 CURRENT POPULATION
SuRvEY, Special Report & Issue Brief No. 149, at 5 (1993). The Bureau of Labor statis-
tics reported that in 1990, 19.6 million workers or eighteen percent of the civilian
workforce worked fewer than thirty-five hours. See Polly Callaghan & Heidi Hartmann,
Contingent Work: A Chart Book on Part-Time and Temporary Employment, 1991 EcoN.
POLY INST., at 2.
4. Cooper, supra note 1, at 526. Richard Belous further describes contingent work-
ers as employees who have a weak affiliation with their employer, no stake in the con-
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can labor statutes were drafted based on assumptions of full-
time traditional work arrangements, 5 employers are able to cir-
cumvent those laws by manipulating their work forces to in-
clude more leased and part-time employees.' The result is that
contingent employees often find themselves outside the scope
and protection of the law.
Because so many workers no longer fit into the traditional
images contemplated by labor laws, the definitions of the words
"employer" and "employee" have now become crucial thresholds
in providing workers' rights. Although the issue seems facially
narrow, it has resounding implications for the security and pres-
ervation of the American worker's rights. Given that many em-
ployers misclassify or reclassify their employees for the very
purpose of avoiding the requirements and liability associated
with social security, unemployment insurance," workers' com-
pany, and are not considered part of the corporate family. Belous, supra note 2, at 865.
In addition, he points out that contingent workers do not have long-term job attachment
and no stability. Id.
5. Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment and
the Paradox of Productivity (unpublished) 30-35 (October 1995).
6. However, this is not an entirely new tactic. Employers have tried to avoid labor
legislation throughout history. For example, in 1944, the Supreme Court was called on to
decide whether "newsboys" who distributed newspapers for Hearst Publications were
considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Hearst's position was that it was not required to
collectively bargain with the newsboys because they were not "employees" under the
NLRA but rather acted as independent contractors. Id. Interestingly, the Court upheld
the NLRB's "News and Herald" collective bargaining units which consisted of all full-
time newsboys engaged to sell papers in Los Angeles. Id. at 132. The Court found that
"[bloot-jackers, temporary, casual and part-time newsboys [were] excluded." Id. Hearst
Publications demonstrates the mind set that only traditional full-time workers deserved
recognition and protection under the labor laws. Therefore, while management has al-
ways tried to maneuver around labor legislation, the new twist is that the increasing
groups of part-time and contingent workers have become the focus of management's ef-
forts to avoid worker protections.
7. See Mary E. O'Connell, Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity of Contingent
Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 889, 894-96. (1995). Professor O'Connell cites to a 1993
General Accounting Office [GAO] report which reveals that the recipient rate for unem-
ployment insurance benefits is only 39%, that is, six in ten unemployed workers who
have applied for benefits since 1990 have been denied. Id. at 894 (citing U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NRD-93-107, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMIrTEE ON Fi.
NANCE, U.S. SENATE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: PROGRAM'S ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIvES
JEOPARDIZED 2 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]). The denials are due, in large part, to
the increase in eligibility criteria which effectively close out the ever-growing population
of contingent workers. For example, each state requires that applicants have worked a
minimm number of weeks or earned a certain wage within a specified period of time in
order to provide unemployment, thereby excluding those who work part-time for low
wages and short duration. Id. at 895 (citing GAO REPORT, supra, at 3). The GAO report
also found that employers manipulate employees' hours and wages to prevent them from
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pensation, the Civil Rights Act,8 the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act 9 (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act 0 (ERISA), and the Family Medical Leave Act" (FMLA),
the issue of what constitutes or defines employment becomes in-
tegral in the battle to secure worker protections. This article
will illustrate one example of how labor laws are often being
"skirted" by employers who manipulate the make up of their
workforce.
This article focuses on how the definitions used in Title VII
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) have
been construed by the federal courts in diverging ways. Because
the laws are designed so that an employer comes under the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts based on how many employees it
"has", a threshold question in Title VII and ADEA litigation is
how to count the number of workers a company employs.
The Federal courts have recognized the "payroll approach"
and the "on the job method" as the two primary ways of count-
ing employees for determining whether the statutory minimum
is met. Various circuits have adopted a method of counting an
employee as "employed" for a particular week if he or she is on
the company's payroll.12 The "payroll method" naturally provides
the broadest protections for labor. The alternative interpreta-
tion, the "on the job" method claims to adhere to the "plain
meaning" of the statutory definitions and considers a person
"employed" for a particular work week only if they are present
at work during every day of that week.13 This "on the job"
reaching the eligibility minimums. Id. at 896 (citing GAO REPORT, supra, at 38).
8. 42 US.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
9. 29 US.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
10. Id. §§ 1001-1461.
11. Id. §§ 2601-2654.
12. See, eg., Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 9104 (1984); Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980); Gou-
deau v. Dental Health Servs., 901 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. La. 1995) (although the court felt
it was inappropriate to apply the payroll method in this case, it did recognize its use in
cases where it has been shown that an employer manipulated work schedules to avoid
Title VII liability); Vera-Lozano v. Intl Broadcasting, 50 F.3d 67, (1st Cir. 1995); Ed-
wards v. Esau Invs., No. 93-4130 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15960 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 1994);
Reith v. Swenson, No. 92-1139 1993 U.S. Dist Lexis 4863 (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 1993); Cohen
v. S.U.P-.A, 814 F. Supp 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery
Assocs. Ltd., 664 F. Supp 212 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F.
Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp.
936 (D. Colo. 1979); Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1325 (D. Minn. 1975).
13. See, eg., Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal, 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Garden and As-
socs., Ltd., 956 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992); Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I
965Fall 1996]
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method, by definition, excludes workers who do not come to
work every day during the work week.
Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has endorsed the "payroll method,"14 the question of
which method is appropriate has yet to be answered by either
the Supreme Court or Congress. However, on November 6, 1996,
the Supreme Court heard argument on this issue and will likely
render a decision in the coming months.15 This article outlines
many of the issues that the Supreme Court should consider
when addressing whether the "payroll method" or the "on the
job" method will be used to count employees in Title VII and
ADEA cases.
Part I of this article outlines the issue concerning the two
primary interpretations that have emerged in Title VII and
ADEA litigation. Part II deals with management and labor's re-
spective positions on the issue and the motivations for each en-
tity's advocated interpretation. Part III outlines the ramifica-
tions of the issue in terms of the changing face of American
labor and the increased use of contingent, or non-traditional
full-time workers over the recent decade. Part IV presents the
argument that the "payroll method" is the appropriate method
of counting employees given the expanded use of part-time
workers and the way management, labor and the law have his-
torically considered and relied on the employment relationship.
I. THE "ON THE JOB" VERSUS THE "PAYROLL" METHOD
Under Title VII, an employer is "a person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or proceeding calendar year."1 The ADEA defini-
tion is exactly the same as stated in Title VII except that an
employer must have twenty employees to be governed by the
Assoc., 855 F Supp. 366 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Young-Gerhard v. Sprinkle Masonry Inc., 856 F.
Supp. 300 (E.D. Va. 1994); Wright v. Kusciusko Medical Clinic, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1327
(N.D. Ind. 1992).
14. See Policy Guidance: Whether Part-time Employees are Employees Within the
Meaning of § 701(b) of Title VII and § 11(b) of the ADEA, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
at 2167, 2313-14 (Apr. 20, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement]. "The Commis-
sion's position is that all regular part-time employees are counted whether they work
part of each day or part of each week.. . " Id. The Commission further stated, "[p]ublic
policy considerations weigh in favor of the broadest possible interpretation and dictate
against the consequences that a stricter construction would have." Id.
15. Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (consolidated with EEOC
v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.), Nos. 95-259, 95-779 (argued Nov. 6, 1996).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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statute.17 Although the definitions ostensibly seem straight for-
ward, the statutes do not explicitly detail a method of counting
employees to determine whether an employer comes under the
jurisdiction of the law. Two different methods of determining
who is employed for purposes of Title VII and the ADEA have
emerged in the various federal circuits; one based on when an
employee punches the clock, the other based on whether an em-
ployee is on the payroll.
A. The "On the Job" Method
The Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises,8 reexamined the standard it had formulated in its
landmark case of Zimmerman v. North American Signal Com-
pany'9. In Zimmerman, the main issue was whether North
American Signal was an "employer" under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA).20 The ADEA's definition was
very similar to that used by Title VII at that time.21 North
American Signal barely missed the requisite number of employ-
ees under the statute by counting 'only salaried or full-time
workers and excluding part-time employees. 22 Noting the lack of
legislative history regarding the section, the court considered
the arguments of the parties. 23 Mr. Zimmerman worked as vice
president for North American Signal for sixteen years before be-
ing fired at the age of 67.24 He asserted that North American
discharged him solely because of his age.25 Further, he argued
that all employees who appeared on the company's payroll for a
given week should be counted for that week based on the pro-
position that the "employment relationship is not broken on the
day [an employee] does not work, at least if he returns the next
week, as most North American [Signal] workers seem to do."
26
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
18. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), argued sub nom. Walters v. Metropolitan Educa-
tional Enterprises, Inc. (consolidated with EEOC v. Metropolitan Educational Enter-
prises, Inc.), Nos. 95-259, 95-779 (Supreme Court Nov. 6, 1996).
19. 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983).
20. Id. at 352-54.
21. The ADEA definition reads as follows: "(b) The term "employer" means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year... " 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
22. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 347.
23. Id. at 352.
24. Id. at 347.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 353.
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The court however held that the language "for each working
day" was inconsistent with Mr. Zimmerman's advocated "pay-
roll" approach.27 Although the court recognized that the ADEA
is "remedial" in nature, which traditionally indicates that it be
broadly interpreted, 28 it formalistically stated that "a court
should not construe a statute in a way that makes words or
phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous." 29 The court
agreed with North American Signal that the words "for each
working day" meant an employee would be counted as employed
during a particular work week only if he or she was present
during each day of the week.30 In addition, the court stated that
the definitional restriction chosen by Congress could have been
drafted in a number of ways in order to exempt small employers
from the Act's coverage, for instance by creating a minimum
based on the number of employees on the payroll of a company,
but that it explicitly did not.
31
However, a look into the legislative history of Title VII
reveals a heated debate and concern over the depth of coverage
of the Act. For example, Senator Dirksen, a co-sponsor of Title
VII mentioned, that after exhaustive testing, the original Senate
committee report on the bill recommended the Civil Rights Act
apply to businesses with only eight employees.32 Senator Dirk-
sen also noted that several statutes begin with a requirement of
merely one employee. He stated, "Are we going to make fish of
one and fowl of another? Are we going to set thirty-one percent
of our working people in one category and say that the law does
not apply to them: whereas in the case of the remaining sixty-
nine percent, the law would apply?"3 3 The Zimmerman Court,
27. Id.
28. See EEOC v. Eagle Iron Workers, 367 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
29. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 353-54.
30. Id. at 354. But see EEOC Policy Statement supra note 13, at 5, for the counter
argument that:
[Tihe phrase Tor each working day' is sufficiently flexible to allow a construc-
tion which will effectuate the legislative intent. Even a literal reading of 'for
each working day' lends itself to a payroll standard inasmuch as 'for each
working day' does not literally mean "at work," nor does the statutory lan-
guage of section 701(b) or section 11(b) contain any limitation indicating that
only those individuals actually at the work site on each working day are to be
considered employees under Title VII.
31. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 354. See 110 CONG. RIc. 13,087 (1964) (revealing a de-
bate as to how to keep small businesses from coming under the purview of the law).
32. 110 CoNG. Rc. 13,087.
33. Id.
[Vol. 44968
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however, found the legislative history of Title VII to be useless
in determining the depth of its coverage.
1. Zimmerman revisited. As previously noted, the Supreme
Court is currently reviewing the "on the job" standard first es-
tablished by the Seventh Circuit in Zimmerman.34 The Court
granted certiorari to review EEOC v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises,35 a case in which the Seventh Circuit revisited its
Zimmerman decision in light of "recent legislative develop-
ments". 36 The claim in Metropolitan was brought under Title
VII, but the court noted that the Zimmerman reasoning under
the ADEA was dispositive.37 The EEOC brought suit on behalf
of Darlene Walters who claimed she had been dismissed in re-
taliation for her filing of a gender discrimination charge against
her employer. The Commission argued that the recent passage
of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)38 indicated that
Congress endorsed the payroll method over the Zimmerman "on
the job" approach.39 To support its argument, the EEOC pointed
out that the Senate Report for the FMLA states:
The quoted [definition of employer] parallels language used in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is intended to receive the same inter-
pretation. As most courts and the EEOC have interpreted this language,
"[e]mploys... employees for each working day is intended to mean "em-
ploy" in the sense of maintain on the payroll. It is not necessary that
every employee actually perform work on each working day to be consid-
ered for this purpose.40
34. Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (consolidated with EEOC
v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.), Nos. 95-259, 95-779 (argued Nov. 6, 1996).
35. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995).
36. Id. at 1225.
37. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1227 n.2. The Court stated that "the ADEs definition
is 'essentially identical to Title vIrs', [and that] 'courts routinely apply arguments' to
the two interchangeably." Id. at 1227 (quoting EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995)).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994).
39. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1227. Specifically, the plaintiff's position was that the
FMIA has-induded a definition of "employer" that closely parallels that in the ADEA
and Title VII. The definition of "employer" in the FMIA reads: "any person engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for
each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The EEOC's argument
is that because § 2611(3) of the FMLA references the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
(29 US.C. § 203(e)) definition of "employee" ("any individual employed by an employer"),
the all-inclusive payroll approach to counting employees should be used.
40. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1993) (emphasis added).
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In addition to the legislative history argument, the EEOC as-
serted that its own guidelines promulgated since Zimmerman
advocate the payroll method4' and that such method is consis-
tent with public policy goals.4
The Seventh Circuit held steadfast to its decision in Zim-
merman. It again offered formalistic justifications for its posi-
tion that employees must be present at work each working day
in order to be counted as "employed." The court curtly stated
that in passing the FMLA, Congress had no special sanction to
interpret the actions of a previous Congress. Therefore, the Met-
ropolitan Court was not persuaded by the argument that Con-
gress, in passing the FMLA, was trying to avert the problems
created by the Title VII and ADEA definitions of "employer."
Moreover, regarding the EEOC's guidelines, the court remarked,
"[w]hile we afford deference to legitimate agency interpretations
of statutory language made before we have ruled on an issue,
the converse is not true: the judiciary, not administrative agen-
cies, is the final arbiter of statutory construction."3 The court
also based its reasoning on stare decisis and stated, "[r]egarding
the circuit split, it is enough to note the large number of recent
cases on both sides of the issue; that some courts have disagreed
with our analysis while others have adopted it hardly presents a
pressing reason to overturn settled precedent."44
The Eighth Circuit, as well as various district courts, have
also adopted the Seventh Circuit's "plain meaning" or "on the
job" approach enunciated in Zimmerman and Metropolitan.45
Most have echoed the rigid reasoning of the Seventh Circuit as
well. In fact, there has been a recent flood of cases where the
courts upheld Zimmerman with a host of new black letter ratio-
nales that only patronizingly acknowledge the purpose and in-
tent behind the enactment of Title VII and the ADEA. In Rich-
ardson v. Bedford Housing Phase I Associates,46 the court
mentioned that Congress could have applied Title VII to all
businesses affecting commerce, but instead, "whether a product
of political compromise or an explicit recognition that small eco-
nomic enterprises cannot bear the regulation and risk of liabil-
ity under Title VII, a strict threshold was set."4 The Richardson
41. See EEOC Policy Statement supra note 14, at 6.
42. Id.
43. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1229-30 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 1229.
45. See cases cited supra note 13.
46. 855 . Supp. 366 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
47. Id. at 371.
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Court also ironically suggested that the congressional debate
over the 1972 amendment to Title VII, which reduced the
threshold from twenty-five to fifteen employees, centered "only"
on the assertion that the reduction would lead "to more employ-
ers being covered, discrimination being reduced and whether
such a change might overload the court dockets."'
s
B. The Payroll Method
The First and Fifth Circuits have rejected the Zimmerman
"on the job" model in favor of the "payroll approach" to settle the
threshold jurisdictional question of how to count employees for
Title VII and ADEA purposes. Five and half months after the
Zimmerman Court endorsed the "on the job" method, the First
Circuit in Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc.49 adopted the "payroll"
method after a discussion of the broader intent of Title VII.50
The Thurber Court stated that, "[w]hile Congressional debate
revealed concern for the over-regulation of small family or
neighborhood businesses, the legislative history generally
weighs heavily against the [employer's] positionf 51 Specifically,
the court found that a co-sponsor of Title VII stated that the
definition of employer was borrowed from the Unemployment
Compensation Act.52 Under that statute, the employee is to be
counted for each day that an employment relationship exists re-
gardless of whether the employee reported to work each day.53
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's position in Zimmerman, the
Thurber court found nothing in the record or in the Title VII
definition that indicated the Congressional intent to require that
employees report to work each day in order to be included.
54
Emphasizing the spirit and remedial character associated
with the purpose of Title VII and the ADEA, Thurber and its
progeny have promoted the idea that employers with part-time
workers were intended to be governed by those laws.5 5 As a re-
48. Id.
49. 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983).
50. Id. at 633-35. The Congressional purpose in passing Title VII is to eliminate "in-
convenience, unfairness and the humiliation of discrimination" Ouijano v. University
Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co.,
560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977).
51. Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634.
52. Id. See generally Unemployment Compensation Act (26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1954)).
53. Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634. See also Rev. Rul. 55-19, Regulation 107 § 403.205
(1955). This rule had been in effect nine years prior to the passage of Title VII.
54. Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634.
55. See Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980) and
Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary Inc., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (D.
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sult, many plaintiffs argue that the definitions used in the laws
should be given the broadest interpretation "consistent with
their benevolent purpose."
56
It is important to note that many, if not all, of the employ-
ers who are accused of discriminating and who have challenged
subject matter jurisdiction, are either marginally under the req-
uisite number fifteen (when their part-time or leased employees
are not counted) or are so situated that the bulk of their em-
ployees simply don't work every day of the week.5 7 The First and
Fifth Circuits' approach in counting employees maintained on
the payroll basically prohibits the splitting of hairs in situations
where a gross violation has occurred and, in doing so, effectu-
ates Congress's intent.
The First and Fifth Circuits have also noted the importance
of something that the Seventh and Eighth circuits have failed to
give credence to-that with the increased use of non-traditional
full-time workers, there is now more than ever the potential for
abuse and resultant lack of protection under Title VII and the
ADEA. In Metropolitan, the Seventh Circuit recognized the is-
sue but stated:
Plaintiffs also present a parade of horribles that could result from con-
tinued application of Zimmerman. Most notably, an employer's ability to
evade the strictures of antidiscrimination legislation simply by structur-
ing operations to avoid having the jurisdictional minimum present on
each working day. Yet in more than a decade since this court ruled in
Zimmerman, this parade has had conspicuously few participants. 8
Likewise, in Goudeau v. Dental Health Services,5 9 the court
agreed that Congress clearly did not intend to cover all employ-
ees and that, in determining how to count employees for the
purpose of determining who is an employer, "[o]nly in the rare
marginal case will the task become more burdensome, and even
then it is unlikely that it will be difficult."
60
On the other hand, the decision in Pascutoi v. Washburn-
McReavy Mortuary was almost prophetic when it noted that,
"[in] this day of changing work conditions and habits the Court
Minn. 1975).
56. Pascutoi, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1325.
57. See cases cited supra note 13.
58. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1230. However, it is important to note that Zimmerman
has been cited by courts situated in all circuits, as well as in various Fair Employment
Practice (F.E.P.) decisions well over 100 times. A significant number of those decisions
have perpetuated the "on the job" standard pronounced in Zimmerman.
59. 901 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. La. 1995).
60. Id. at 1144.
[Vol. 44972
COUNTING EMPLOYEES
cannot say that a person must work 40 hours or more during
any seven day period."1' Likewise, in Gorman v. North Pitts-
burgh Oral Surgery Associates,6 2 the court also realized that the
changing nature of the workforce created an opportunity for
abuse under the ADEA. The Gorman court criticized the Zim-
merman "on the job" method by saying that, "[u]nder [that] con-
struction, a business that operates almost entirely with part-
time labor could escape the prohibitions of the ADEA, despite
the number of workers actually employed."63 Recently, in Ed-
wards v. Esau6 4 the court stated, "[u]nder the Zimmerman ap-
proach a company could avoid the reach of Title VII by manipu-
lating the schedules of part-time employees regardless of the
number of employees actually on its weekly payroll. Thus,
adopting the Zimmerman approach is to recognize that employ-
ers may structure their work forces so as to avoid Title VII
coverage."
65
Even one decision which upheld the Zimmerman case ques-
tioned the soundness of the "on the job" approach given the po-
tential for abuse. In Wright v. Kosciusko Medical Clinic Inc.,66 a
district court within the Seventh Circuit, stated:
It seems to the Court that the -far sounder interpretation of these stat-
utes is that an employer 'has' an employee not only if he or she works on
a particular day, but rather if he or she is on the company's payroll. Dur-
ing all of 1988 and 1989, more than twenty persons, if asked for whom
they worked, would have identified Kosciusko Medical Clinic as their
'employer'. More importantly, these were all persons who had a genuine
'employment' relationship with the defendant. 7
The Wright Court noted such factors as regular performance
of duties and whether each worker was entitled to certain finan-
cial benefits and legal protections as appropriate considerations
61. Pascutoi, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1325. The plaintiff alleged sex dis-
crimination because as a female mortician she was denied the opportunity to perform
certain jobs and to participate in staff meetings. The Defendant in Pascutoi had claimed
that although it had 15 or more employees during the appropriate time period, in no
week did its employees work every working day. Because the court elected the broader
"payroll" interpretation, the plaintiff was not barred on jurisdictional grounds from pur-
suing her claim. Id.
62. Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Pa.
1987).
63. Id. at 214.
64. 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 711 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 1994).
65. Id. at 714.
66. 791 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
67. Id. at 1331.
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in counting "employees."68 However, the Wright Court, in the
true tradition of the Seventh Circuit, effectively stated its hands
were tied and that, "it [was] not th[e] court's place to disregard
circuit precedent."69
In Title VII and ADEA cases, the plaintiff is ultimately at
the mercy of the court's decision regarding the appropriate
method of counting employees to determine jurisdiction under
the statutes. If a circuit court chooses to adopt the "on the job"
approach, it effectively accepts a corporation's freedom to manip-
ulate its workforce. Conversely, if a circuit court endorses the
payroll approach, it is necessarily providing protection to all
workers "on the books." The logical next question is, therefore,
what is at stake for these two factions?
II. LABOR VERSUS MANAGEMENT
At first glance, it should seem obvious why workers would
prefer to be counted under the "payroll" method and why em-
ployers would advocate for the application of the "on the job"
method. Employees would much rather be afforded the protec-
tion of the all-inclusive "payroll method" than find out that be-
cause they are not present every day of the work week they are
not really "employed." However, it is worth taking a step back to
consider the modern context in which both labor and manage-
ment operate. Today's workplace bears only scant resemblance
70
to that which prompted the formulation of many labor laws.71
A. Management's Motives
As law professor, now NLRB Chair, William Gould points
out, "the economy has now become globalized, and trade unions
that functioned in industries previously oligopolistic are now no
longer immune to foreign and domestic competition."72 The need
to compete in a global economy is often cited as the primary
reason why employers feel the need to utilize a "flexible"
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1332.
70. See WILLAm B. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM (1993) (exploring issues confronting
the changing nature of employer/employee relationships since the passage of the NLRA).
71. See Silverstein & Goselin, supra note 5, at 35 (summing up the problem of
workers being excluded from the protection provided by some labor laws because, "Con-
gress, in drawing the statutory criteria, did not contemplate their role in the economy
and considered protective legislation to be appropriate only for the full-time, permanent
employee under the direct control of a single employing enterprise.").
72. GOuLD, supra note 70, at 10.
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workforce.7 3 By cutting down the number of hours an employee
works or by "downsizing," firms can cut labor costs even at the
expense of decreasing productivity and the reliability of the
workforce.7 4 According to economist Eileen Appelbaum, the pur-
suit of "static flexibility" means that employers are looking for
"'cheap labor and immediate adjustment to changing market
conditions' via the destandardization of the terms of employ-
ment, making hours of work more flexible and unpredictable...
!,75 The filling of temporary needs has also been suggested as
another justification for the increase in leased employees, a
neighbor to the part-time employee, included in the amorphous
definition of the "contingent workforce."
76
Traditionally, sectors such as the service and trade indus-
tries are the predominant employers of part-time labor. As Chris
Tilly points out, the increase in part-time work is explained by
the rapid expansion of these industries. 7 The expansion of the
service industry was, in turn, caused by the shift of "industry
composition of employment" away from manufacturing toward
industries such as trade and services.78 The "shift" also accounts
for the explosion of temporary agencies which are the primary
supplier of the "secondary"79 employers of contingent and part-
73. Conflicts and Inconsistencies in Workplace Regulations: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Economic and Educa-
tional Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1995) (statement of Anthony P. Came-
vale, Chairman of the National Commission for Employment Policy) [hereinafter
Carnevale Congressional Testimony]. See also Chris Tilly, Reasons for the Continuing
Growth of Part-time Employment, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1991, at 10 (for the proposi-
tion that industry sector growth and demographics have played a role in the increased
use of part-time workers). The explosive demand for part-time and contingent workers
dates back to the 1980's. See Francoise J. Carre, Temporary Employment in the Eighties,
in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 45, 72 (Virginia L.
duRivage ed., 1992).
74. Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Short Shrift: The Causes and Consequences of Part-
Time Employment, in NEW POLICIES FoR THE PART-TheE AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE,
supra note 73, at 31. See also Rise of Contingent Workers Cuts Cost, Compromises Em-
ployee Identification, [Oct. 19951 Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. d56, at C-207 (Oct. 26,
1995) (for the idea that restructuring and concern over the need to cut costs stems from
the "shock caused by spiraling inflation in the late 1970's, back-to-back recessions in the
early 1980's," as well as increased global competition).
75. Eileen Appelbaum, Structural Change and the Growth of Part-Time and Tempo-
rary Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE,
supra note 73, at 10.
76. H. Lane Dermard, Jr. & Herbert R. Northrup, Leased Employment: Character,
Numbers and Labor Law Problems, 28 GA. L. REV. 683, 725 (1994).
77. Tilly, supra note 73, at 15.
78. Id.
79. Secondary employers are employers who lease employees from an employment
agency. The agency is thus considered the .primary" employer. Id.
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time labor.80 In fact, it is astonishing to note that today the na-
tion's largest employer is not General Motors or IBM81, but
Manpower, Inc., a temporary employment service.
8 2
Despite the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Metropolitan, the
reality is that, in many instances, the strategy behind manage-
ment's shift from being a primary employer to leasing tempo-
rary and part-time employees is to skirt the liability associated
with insurance, social security, the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA),8 3 Title VII8 4 and the ADEA, not to
mention a host of other labor laws.8 5 For example, the 1993
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) applies to companies
with fifty or more employees. 8 6 One corporate president was
quoted as saying, "Fifty is the magic number," meaning she con-
sciously keeps her payroll to under fifty employees to avoid com-
ing under the purview of the FMLA.8 7 As another example, in
80. Id.
81. Carnevale Congressional Testimony, supra note 73, at 61 (citing Frank Swo-
boda, Age of Anxiety: As Fears of Job Loss Grow, So Do Calls for Safety Net, WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 1993, at H1).
82. William Charland, Some Temps Work as College Presidents, RocmY MTN. NEws,
Sept. 17, 1995, at C1.
83. For example, the Travelers Insurance Company keeps a "well-publicized on-call
pool of retirees," whose individual hours do not exceed 960 hours per year (just under
ERISA's statutory threshold of 1000 hours) "to prevent them from accruing additional
pension credits that would increase their pension" Carre, supra note 73, at 78-79.
84. Even author Maria O'Brien Hylton, who staunchly admonishes proposals for in-
creasing protection for the "new work force," acknowledges in her article, The Case
Against Regulating the Market for Contingent Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849,
858-59 (1995), that:
An employer seeking to avoid Title VII coverage, thereby preserving the ability
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, religion and national origin,
might seriously consider hiring contingent workers once there are thirteen or
fourteen core employees. Properly structured, the contingent workers would not
"count" as employees for purposes of the statute, and the employer would re-
main free from Title VIrs dictates.
Hylton does, however, suggest as an alternative to additional labor regulation, lowering
the "trigger" or threshold requirements of existing regulations such as Title VII. Id. at
860. "Such a measure would reduce the incentives to hire contingent workers in order to
maintain working environments infected by bias." Id.
85. See generally Dennard & Northrup, supra note 76.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
87. Dennard & Northrup, supra note 76, at 690. It should be noted that this em-
ployer is assuming that if sued for a violation of the FMLA, a federal court would im-
pose the payroll method and therefore, she must keep her payroll to no more than the
statutory threshold number of 50 in order to argue her company is not covered by the
statute. Id. at 689-90. However, many corporate executives manipulate their workforces,
i.e. payrolls, so that even if they have more than the statutory minimum, part-time and
contingent employees comprise the majority of their employees and thus would not be
counted under the Zimmerman on the job method.
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1993 Bank of America fired thousands of full-time tellers and
loan officers and rehired them as part-time employees. 8 The
reclassification allowed the bank to eliminate their health, pen-
sion, and vacation benefits.89 Richard Belous, Vice President and
Chief Economist at the National Planning Association in Wash-
ington, D.C. stated it is not surprising that many employers
have made a "'rational' utility-maximizing decision to violate
federal and state labor laws because the probability of punish-
ment is often low and the fines are often cheap"90
Therefore, from the employer's perspective, it is most benefi-
cial to sever any ties with its labor beyond the time its workers
punch the time clock. Modern workplace organization has thus
been described as "a small cast of full-time permanent employ-
ees augmented by a much larger, ever-changing population of
part-time, temporary and other contingent workers operating at
all levels of a firm's hierarchy."9'
B. The Employee's Perspective
As for the employee who wishes to be counted based on his
or her employment relationship, in a climate where part-time la-
bor is even more "at the will" 92 of the employer than permanent
full-time employee, job security, along with other benefits are
88. 140 CONG. REC. S14247 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (introduction of the Contingent
Workforce Equity Act by Senator Metzenbaum).
89. Id. See also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1189 (1996) (where the
Ninth Circuit prefaced an opinion by stating that, "[1]arge corporations have increasingly
adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independant contractors as a
means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, and thereby increasing their profits.
This practice has understandably led to a number of problems legal and otherwise").
Microsoft had attempted to restrict retirement plan eligibility to "common law employ-
ees" who were paid through the payroll department. Id. at 1195. It maintained that em-
ployees who were paid through the accounts receivable department could not be paid in
a manner that would comply with I.R.S. requirements and therefore, these employees
were not intended to be covered by its 401(k) plan. Id. This case demonstrates yet an-
other way an employer can manipulate the status of their employees in an attempt to
deny benefits.
90. Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges
and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 863, 863-64 (1995).
91. Silverstein & Goselin, supra note 5, at 5.
92. Professor Mary E. O'Connell points out that "the roots of employment law lie in
the ancient relation of master and servant, not in the johnny-come-lately law of con-
tract" and that "by law or custom, masters owed many obligations to their servants."
O'Connell, supra note 7, at 897. In this article, O'Connell gives a thorough account of
how "employer provision has been a cornerstone of economic well-being in the United
States from pre- industrial times to the present day." Id. at 902.
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increasingly non-existent.9 3 For example, part-time workers are
more likely than full-time workers to be disqualified from re-
ceiving unemployment insurance benefits during the eligibility
screening process.94 It is also estimated that while nearly half of
full-time workers receive pension benefits, only fifteen percent of
part-time employees have employer-sponsored plans.95 This is
due in part to the fact that the Employee Retirement and In-
come Security Act (ERISA) currently requires that employees
must work more than 1,000 hours per year (twenty hours per
week) to be included in a company's retirement plan.96 It is sur-
prising to note that over 450,000 federal workers are employed
in temporary and part-time positions without any benefits at
ally.' The largest bulk of part-time employees have no choice but
to rely on their spouse's full-time employer for health and dental
benefits.98
The evolving history of the traditional labor-management
relationship has made labor dependent on the employer.9 9 Most
93. It is a fact that part-time employees are left largely outside of the representa-
tion of unions who often shun them as a threat to their very own existence. One labor
leader has stated that the use of contingent workers "undermines efforts to develop and
maintain a highly skilled and experienced workforce" Carnevale Congressional Testi-
mony, supra note 73, at 61 (quoting Leased Employees Lawyers Debate Advantages,
Drawbacks of Rise of Use of Contingent Workers, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) Aug. 13,
1993)). It was also suggested that the use of contingent workers is a detriment to "labor-
management cooperation... because these workers are going to be less invested in the
process due to their employment status with the company." Id.
94. New Eligibility Standards for UI Benefits Recommended By Commission, Daily
Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. d21, at A-179 (Sept. 15, 1995). However, according to the study,
part-time workers are most likely to be disqualified for failing to meet weeks of employ-
ment, high quarter, and base-period, and earnings requirements, not definitional re-
quirements. Id. Nevertheless, their part-time hours and contingent schedules are the
cause of the deficiencies that disqualify them (i.e. low pay, irregular patterns of employ-
ment). See also Tilly, supra note 73, at 37.
95. 140 CONG. REc. S14247 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (introduction of the Contingent
Workforce Equity Act by Senator Metzenbaum). For an alternative perspective that ER-
ISA, as amended, encourages employers to extend pension benefits to contingent work-
ers, see Stewart J. Schwab, The Diversity of Contingent Workers and the Need for
Nuanced Policy, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REy. 915, 923-25. However, Schwab makes light of
the fact that those who are kept under the statutory minimum of 1000 hours are still
closed out of the benefits no matter how willing an employer is to induct them into its
plan again, a problem at the threshold. Id.
96. Tilly, supra note 73, at 38.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Gwen Thayer Handelman, On Our Own: Strategies for Securing Health and Re-
tirement Benefits in Contingent Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 815. "Employment
has served as the primary institutional mechanism through which the United States has
met the population's basic social welfare needs, and the employment relationship has
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industrial jobs were unstable during the turn of the century.00
For example, Daniel T. Rogers described the workforce between
the years of 1900-1920 as "strikingly mobile."' 0 ' "At the Armour
meat-packing plant in Chicago, for example, the average daily
payroll numbered about eight thousand during 1914. But to
keep that many employees, the company hired eight thousand
workers during the course of the year, filling and refilling the
places of transients." 0 2 Labor historians observe that in the
early twentieth century, businesses formed a "social contract"
with labor by taking on increased responsibility for their
worker's welfare. 0 3 Historian David Montgomery points out
that:
[u]ntil World War I, and for some people considerably later, most ordi-
nary laborers' work was purely contingent, where people were hired
mostly for the day. That kind of practice was used mainly for work that
didn't require much training-but it was extremely widespread. It tended
to become less and less common over the 1920s, 30s and 40s when em-
ployers wanted to stabilize their workforces and wanted people they
could train who would not disappear on them."
104
Professor Joe McCartin adds that businesses increasingly
bore the costs of employee benefits as the rise of unions and the
prominence of the pro-labor and pro-collective bargaining legis-
lation appeared during the New Deal Era on through the
1960s. 0 5 Some argue that today the use of contingent workers is
aimed at "undercutting established unions and the establish-
ment of unions, because contingent workers are so fearful of
been the principal determinant of social welfare." Id.
100. Sanford M. Jacoby & Sunil Sharma, Employment Duration and Industrial La-
bor Mobility in the United States, J. OF EcoN. HiST., Mar. 1992, at 161. This article dis-
cusses stability and tenure of workers in industrial labor markets in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Id.
101. DANIEL T. ROGERS, THE WoRK ETHic IN INDusTRiAL AMERICA, 1850-1920 (1978).
102. Id. at 163.
103. Rise of Contingent Workers Cuts Cost, Compromises Employee Identification,
Daily Rep. For Exec. (BNA) No. d56, at C-207 (Oct. 26, 1995) [hereinafter Contingent
Workers].
104. Id. See also H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTo L.J.
4, 16 (1996) (discussing that "[w]hen one speaks of detachment of the workforce, as it
was tacitly assumed to be fifty years ago, one was speaking of a workforce whose atti-
tudes were shaped by experience of the depression and the war, a workforce of rising-
but essentially modest-expectations, a relatively homogeneous workforce, and especially
a male workforce.). For a discussion about the new economy---[g]lobalization, the incon-
gruent spaces and diminished roles of the nation state, the reorganization of production,
management and work", see Arthurs, supra.
105. Contingent Workers, supra note 103, at C-207.
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jobs and so easy to lay off .... It is an anti-union as well as
cost-cutting tactic."106 AFL-CIO Economist Markley Roberts
notes that, as a higher percentage of contingent workers make
up the workforce, "you have more people who are uncertain
about their job tenure and more reluctant to challenge the com-
pany."107 Professor Montgomery noted that the practice of replac-
ing full-time workers with contingent employees to fight unioni-
zation dates back to the early decades of the 20th century.08
It is somewhat understandable why unions would shun
part-time and contingent workers who are perceived to repre-
sent a threat to their very existence. However, history illus-
trates that unions should welcome the opportunity to induct the
"new" type of worker into their membership. For example, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) refused to allow women
and blacks entrance into their apprenticeship programs. 1 9 A
resolution was even proposed at the AFL's 1898 national conven-
tion which urged confinement of women to the home. 1 0 New
highly specialized unions sustained their power by restricting
entry into their trade, by excluding women, blacks and
Asians."' However, other early unions were very inclusive and
successful, such as the United Mine Workers who capitalized on
the opportunity to represent all groups, and in doing so, sought
to organize labor into one massive union to provide strength in
numbers."2 It has been proven that unions can represent tempo-
rary and part-time workers without jeopardizing full-time em-
ployment opportunities." 3 In fact, it has been suggested that
some unions have even benefitted by making available the op-






109. Catherine Connolly, Hidden Discrimination in the Work Status Distinctions in
Federal Labor Policy 61 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New
York (Buffalo)).
110. Id. at 63.
111. EILEEN BORIS & NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF
AmEIcAN WORKERS 229 (1991).
112. Id.
113. Virginia L. duRivage, New Policies for the Part-Time and Contingent Workforce,
supra note 73, at 117. She mentions that "unions have sought to include these workers
in their bargaining units." Id. As an example, duRivage references the United Auto
Worker's agreement with Mazda Motors Corp. Id. duRivage also mentions, however, that
in the manufacturing industry "unions have been successful in restricting or prohibiting
use of part-time and contingent employes.m " Id.
114. SHELDON FRIEDMAN ET. AL., RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
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It has been argued that because most national union lead-
ers are older and tend to perpetuate the antiquated exclusionary
philosophies of the '50s and 60s, they fail to understand or even
perceive the need to organize non-traditional employees in white
collar sectors such as the service industry.115 The exclusion of
part-time workers, however, has less to do with the prejudices
that motivated the AFL membership policies than it has to do
with the fact that, "unions and employers have traditionally
viewed part-time and temporary workers outside of the scope of
collective bargaining."1 6 This traditional view has been fostered
in part by the laws that govern unionization." 7 Virginia du Riv-
age argues that the reason unions face difficulties in represent-
ing part-time and contingent employees is "employee classifica-
tion schemes associated with the diversification of employee
work schedules as well as the failure of labor law to protect con-
tract workers."1i Virginia duRivage explains that the NLRB de-
termines what are "appropriate bargaining units," that is the
units for which the Board holds a "representational election.""9
She states, "[t]he Board has been inconsistent in its rulings as
to whether part-time and contingent workers should vote along
with full-time employees in representational elections." °2 0 Like-
wise, Dorothy Sue Cobble explored the need to unionize in a
post-industrial society and at the top of her list regarding labor
law reform is the expansion of the definition of "employee"
under the NLRA, for purposes of exercising rights to collective
bargaining.'2' The problem of inconsistencies in interpreting em-
ployment definitions is strikingly familiar-just as some part-
time employees are denied protection under labor laws because
the courts are inconsistent in interpreting definitions, part-time
employees are often denied union membership benefits because
of inconsistencies in NLRB determinations regarding their
status.
317 (1994).
115. Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of
Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MIcE.. L. REv. 1616 (1995) (reviewing WIL-
iAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND
THE LAw (1993)).
116. duRivage, supra note 113, at 116. See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 US. 111 (1944).




121. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 295.
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The 1990s are similar to the time before 1920 in the sense
that employers are increasingly employing contingent labor and
that unions are either largely ineffective 2 2 or unwelcoming of
part-time and contingent labor. Therefore, workers can no longer
rely on their employers or their unions to protect and provide
for their welfare.2 3
In addition to the fact that part-time workers are often de-
nied employment benefits, they are also in many cases forced to
take their low-paying positions. In the part-time sector, over six
million workers are involuntarily working at their jobs, in the
sense that they would prefer to be employed in full-time posi-
tions but cannot find full-time work.24 Not only are they work-
ing less, they are earning less. On the average, part-time work-
ers earn sixty-two cents for every dollar earned by full-time
workers. 125 The fact that part-time labor is paid considerably
less than its full-time colleagues is reflective of the skill level re-
quired in part-time positions. Tilly states that, "[e]mployers are
hunting for part-timers in the low skill jobs that make up secon-
dary labor markets. The involuntary full-timers are those in jobs
requiring greater skill, where retention part-time jobs are ra-
tioned only to the most deserving employees."1 26 In the past,
workers with greater skill have always been able to earn a
higher wage. Analysts have expressed the fear that the wage
differential between full-time skilled and part-time unskilled
workers will, in a sense, create a two-tiered labor market.127
122. Holly Sklar, We Need a New Economic Bill of Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 4,
1995, at A17 (Sklar argues that "union jobs provide much better wages and benefits
than their non-union counterparts, but they are fast disappearing. The unionized per-
centage of the U.S. workforce was just 15.5 percent in 1994").
123. Economist Dan Lacey states, "We've entered an era in which the individual,
not the giant corporation, is the engine of the economy and in which graduation-to-grave
job security is obsolete Labor Day '89 Will Mark the End of a Dramatic Decade, PR
Newswire, Aug. 25, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRNEWS File.
124. 140 CoNG. REC. S14247 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (introduction of the Contingent
Workforce Equity Act by Senator Metzenbaum).
125. Id. See Connolly, supra note 109, for the proposition that the wage gap and in-
ferior terms and conditions of employment associated with part-time work is the result
of hidden gender discrimination against those who do not fit a 'male model' of a tradi-
tional full-time worker.
126. Tilly, supra note 73, at 33.
127. Virginia Baldwin Hick, Full-Time Jobs Decline for Nation's Workforce; Security
Erodes as More Part-Timers Clock In, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al.
Hick fears the nations will evolve into "a core workforce of elite workers and huge
masses of people who are contingent, with lesser benefits, lesser pay and a lesser lifes-
tyle." Id. However, as Silverstein and Goselin point out, since involuntary part-time and
temporary workers are comprised largely of female and African Americans, they are al-
ready experiencing differentials in wages, benefits and opportunities. See Silverstein &
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Labor would obviously contend that while the perceived
needs of management may have changed, the needs of workers,
especially part-time and contingent workers, have remained the
same and even increased. The part-time employee's plea to the
court, in say the context of an employment discrimination
charge under Title VII or the ADEA, would then be to protect
that worker in the spirit of those laws until such time as those
laws, which currently reflect traditional employment relation-
ships, "catch up."
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE DILEMMA
The issue of making uniform the "payroll" method of count-
ing employees throughout the Federal circuits has wide ramifi-
cations. First, as Judge Ripple stated in his concurrence in the
Seventh Circuit's recent Metropolitan decision, "[t]his issue is
one, however, that deserves definitive legislative attention. The
ambiguity of the present situation ought to be clarified. The
scope of Title VII ought to be the same in Boston and New Orle-
ans as it is in Chicago." 28 However, aside from the fact that the
inconsistency among the circuits must be reconciled, the ques-
tion takes on importance for other reasons. While the problem of
how to count employees for purposes of determining who is an
"employer" under Title VII and the ADEA has existed for over
two decades, it becomes even more crucial in light of the ex-
panded use of part-time and non-traditional labor during that
time. The prophesy of Pacutoi, also shared by the EEOC, is be-
ing fulfilled--employers in some areas of the country are effec-
tively escaping the mandates provided by the employment dis-
crimination statutes because they have largely comprised their
workforce of part-time labor who, by definition, are not "on the
job" or present at work every day.
The issue has additional significance in that part-time
workers are not the only aggrieved employees who suffer if the
"on the job" approach is applied. In many cases, where this
method has successfully enabled employers to argue they were
not "employers" under the statutes, it was a full-time employee
who actually brought the suit.129 The situation where a tradi-
tional full-time employee is barred on jurisdictional grounds
from asserting a claim of employment discrimination because of
the make up of his employer's workforce is an anomaly because
Goselin, supra note 5, at 3 n.5.
128. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1230.
129. See, eg., Zimmerman v. North American Signal, 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983).
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the full-time employee has a "legitimate" or traditional employ-
ment relationship.
The question of how an employee should be counted based
on his or her employment relationship or on his or her mere
physical presence also has significance because it goes to the
very heart and intent behind Title VII and the ADEA130 . Title
VII outlaws discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, or
national origin.1 1 The ADEA prohibits employment discrimina-
tion based on age.132 A worker may file suit if he or she feels
that an employer has discriminated against him or her based on
membership in one of the protected groups. Studies continually
show that part-time workers in the United States are "primarily
female, young or old,"133 and that "two-thirds of part-time work-
ers are women, and another 16 percent are men ages 16 to 21
or 65 and over."13 4 Regardless of how the demographic break-
down might reflect the employment choices of these particular
groups, 13 5 the fact that Title VII and the ADEA were drafted
with the intent of protecting these very groups is significant.
The conclusion can then be drawn that since part-time workers
are comprised largely of persons in protected classes, it only
makes sense to include them when counting employees in order
to determine jurisdiction under the ADEA and Title VII.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT "RELATIONSHIP"
Aside from the impact that applying the "on the job" versus
the "payroll" method has in individual cases, the reason why
courts should use the "payroll" method instead of one that deter-
mines the existence of an "employer" based on something that is
well within the control of business, is that an approach which
recognizes a labor-management relationship is consistent with
130. "The purpose of [Title VIII is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and
informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin." HR. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401. An amendment prohibiting gender discrimination was ad-
ded a year later. See 110 CONG. REC. H2584 (1964).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
133. Tilly, supra note 70, at 12.
134. Id. But see Belous, supra note 90, at 868 (pointing out that while the number
of men who are part-time workers has increased from 1985-1993, the number of women
holding part-time positions has declined slightly). Belous also states that while women
constitute a significant portion of the contingent labor force, men represent 54.3% of the
business services portion and over sixty percent of the "services to building" subset of
contingent labor. Id. at 870.
135. Belous, supra note 90, at 870.
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the balance that the law seeks to achieve between employers
and employees, and because it contributes to a healthy
economy.13
6
The history of labor-management relations is often charac-
terized as a struggle, 137 and in an environment in which em-
ployee representation is decreasing, partly because employees
are being forced into non-traditional employment forms such as
part-time and leased positions, management seems to be gaining
the upper hand. Professor Mary E. O'Connell commented:
Employment is inherently a conundrum, for it is simultaneously a trans-
action and a relation. It is a contract, and it is a way of life. Indeed, one
can view employment as a constantly shifting balance, with relation
dominating at some points and transaction at others. But the break has
never been complete-until, perhaps, now. The defining feature of contin-
gent employment may be that it renders work a nearly pure transaction,
stripped of any pretense of relation between employer and employee. 13
However, an examination of the types of tests historically
used in law reveals that society has come to recognize the exis-
tence and necessity of the "employment relationship." As laws
designed to protect the rights of workers become ineffective be-
cause they do not recognize the non-traditional employee, and
with Congress being controlled by Republicans hostile to la-
bor,139 it becomes even more important for the courts to inter-
pret statutory definitions as providing protection for contingent
workers.
A. Existing Legal Framework
Under Title VII, the ADEA and various other labor laws,
whether a person is considered an employee is determined by
applying one of three common law tests: either the hybrid eco-
136. The NLRA was designed 'to avert the substantial obstruction to the free flow
of commerce which results from strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest by
eliminating the causes of that unrest (inequality of bargainning power)." NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944).
137. See PREmiLE OF THE INDusriAL WoRKERs OF THE WoRLD (1908), reprinted in
BoaLs & LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 111, at 235.
138. O'Connell, supra note 7, at 896.
139. See Peter Szekely, Obstacles Face Sweeney in Rebuilding Union Strength,
Reuters, Oct. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUBUS File. This article
points out that the current Congress is threatening to weaken protections regarding a
ban on employer-dominated unions, workplace safety laws and the length of the work
week. Id. The article also talks about the opportunity for unions to expand and provide
services to contingent workers. Id.
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nomic realities test/common law agency test,140 the pure eco-
nomic realities test developed under the Fair Labor Standards
Act,' 4 ' or the pure common law agency test. 42 All three ap-
proaches are designed to determine the same thing-whether an
employment relationship exists.
There are several factors common to each of the three tests
such as: (1) the degree of control company exercises over the
person, (2) opportunities the individual creates for company's
profit or loss, (3) investment in facilities, (4) permanency of the
relationship, and (5) skill required.'4 Often when the threshold
question of whether a company comes under the jurisdiction of
Title VII or the ADEA, the next question is whether the plain-
tiff is an "employee" under the statute. The second step is inher-
140. Today most courts use the hybrid test to determine employee status under Ti-
tle VII and the ADEA. The factors used in this test, first set forth in Spirides v. Rein-
hardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979), are as follows: the kind of occupation, with refer-
ence to whether the work is usually done with supervision; the skill required; whether
the employer or the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place
of work; the length of time during which the individual has worked; the method of pay-
ment; the manner in which the work relationship is terminated (i.e. with notice);
whether annual leave is afforded; whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits
(this characteristic seems circular to me-we will provide benefits of Title VII if this
worker is receiving benefits) and likewise whether the employer pays social security
taxes and; the intention of the parties.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). A minority of circuit courts have adopted this test for
Title VII and ADEA purposes. The pure "economic realities" test determines a person's
status as an employee based on whether that person is economically dependent for his
livelihood on the business to which the person performs a service. Five factors used to
make this determination are: (1) the extent of the employer's supervision and control
over the worker, (2) the kind of occupation and skill required and if skills are obtained
on the job; (3) responsibility for the cost of operation and equipment; (4) the method of
payment and benefits; (5) the length of job commitment and or expectations. Id.
142. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). The Supreme
Court adopted the common-law test for determining who qualifies as an employee under
ERISA and described the test such that:
[iln determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general com-
mon law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished. Among other factors relevant
to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship of the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants.
Id. at 323-24.
143. Carnevale Congressional Testimony, supra note 73, at 63. Carnevale points out
that the test emphasizes economic dependence on the company. Id. See also Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
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ently circular in that in the first step required the counting of
employees. How does one count what has not yet been defined?
In a purely logical sense, it is unreasonable to, on the one
hand, define an employee in terms of a dependent relationship,
a two-sided interaction, and on the other hand define an em-
ployer based purely on the attendance (and not the relationship)
of employees. The inconsistency was pointed out in Armbruster
v. Quinn,'" where the court noted that to conclude one is an em-
ployee for the purposes of Title VII and yet find that he or she
is not to be considered as an employee for the purpose of meet-
ing the fifteen-employee jurisdictional requirement would frus-
trate the very intent of the Act.14
It is also important to note that leased employees have been
allowed by the courts to sue their "secondary" employers' 46 for
violations of Title VII and the ADEA on theories of "joint em-
ployer" status. In such cases, courts have shown more leniency
in allowing leased employees, which arguably have a more tenu-
ous employment relationship than part-time workers, to be pro-
tected under these laws. Consequently, it is up to the courts to
acknowledge the new type of employment relationship and rec-
ognize that this "gap" enjoyed by management is closed for part-
time employees as well.
B. Impact on the Economy
Because of the increased use of contingent or non-tradi-
tional labor, it would be detrimental to the economy to define
workers based on their mere presence at work instead of by
their relationship to their employer because productivity and ef-
ficiency may be lost due to the loss of worker loyalty.1 47 Manage-
ment claims the need to compete in a global economy necessi-
tates downsizing and cost cutting by manipulating workers'
hours and titles' 48 so they do not qualify for benefits. This type
144. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 1340.
146. Secondary employers are employers who lease employees from an employment
agency. The agency is thus considered the "primary" employer.
147. Arne Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates
and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L REV. 771, 791 (1995). Another possible detrimental
effect of allowing employers to disavow the employment relationship would be that soci-
ety would be forced to increase social insurance in order to provide the benefits discon-
tinued by employers. See O'Connell, supra note 7, at 904.
148. "Employers who treat their workers as independent contractors avoid paying
half of the Social Security and Medicare taxes, pay no unemployment insurance or work-
ers' compensation, and avoid the health, pension, vacation and other benefits paid to
employees" Shannon P. Duffy, Bias Suit Debates Title VII Definitions; Action Against
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of short-sighted goal arguably sacrifices productivity 149 and con-
sumption in the domestic economy. For example, Management
Consultant Scott Setrakian stated:
There is a spiritual dimension to working in a team structure that is fa-
cilitated by longevity, familiarity, fighting from the same foxhole and
evolving and maturing together. While this is not solely the province of
full-time employment, it's my observation that it is primarily in that
province, and that a wholesale replacement of 10 full-time employees by
20 half-time employees would ... result in material long-term disloca-
tion of a company's culture, spirit and momentum.1' °
Setrakian also argues that production suffers when loyalty
and moral declines. 15' Likewise, Professor Arne Kalleberg sug-
gests that management's approach to reducing payroll may
lower work effort decreasing productivity and product quality.
5 2
There is also validity to the related argument that workers'
evaluation of their jobs depend on their assessment of the rela-
tion between their work values and their job rewards. 153 It was
noted that several workers are in contingent or part-time posi-
tions involuntarily due to lack of more favorable alternatives.
Therefore, we must remember that dissatisfaction regarding
compensation is likely to breed poor quality.
The very impetus behind the introduction of reform mea-
sures such as the Contingent Workforce Equity Act 5 4 is to pro-
Law Firm Seeks to Define 'Employer, Employee'. THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCE.R, Oct. 12,
1995, at 5 (quoting attorney William McLaughlin). The article describes a recent case
where attorney Sherrie Oshiver's sex discrimination suit has centered on the battle over
the meanings of "employee" and "employer." Id. The case illustrates another way employ-
ers try to skirt the 15-employee jurisdictional requirement, by misclassifying their em-
ployees. Id. This is, of course, reminiscent of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 US. 111
(1944).
149. Silverstein & Goselin supra note 5, at 24-25 (arguing that "the disappearance
of traditional jobs irrevocably results in the disappearance of the desired employee be-
havior. There is simply no incentive for contingent work employees as currently used to
participate in improving productivity or for employers to invest in the training of their
contingent workforce.").'
150. Donna K.H. Walters, Southern California Careers/Part-time Careers; Managers
Find Added Challenges, LA. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1995, at D13.
151. Id.
152. Kalleberg, supra note 147, at 791.
153. Id. at 787.
154. 140 CONG. REC. S14247 (daffy ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (introduction of the Contingent
Workforce Equity Act by Senator Metzenbaum). The bill was never enacted and when
Senator Metzenbaum retired, it was not sponsored by another member of the senate.
However, the arguments made by Senator Metzenbaum in support of the bill have been
used to support many of the newer proposals in regards to either providing increased
protection for contingent workers or providing disincentives for employers to create con-
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vide greater financial security to American contingent workers.
The federal bill, once introduced by Senator Metzenbaum, was
designed to close legal loopholes and, as a result, dissuade em-
ployers from eliminating full-time positions. 55 As the now for-
mer Senator stated, "We need a high wage, high productivity
strategy to ensure U.S. competitiveness into the next century.
But the increasing use of contingent labor-a central feature of
a low-wage strategy-takes us in the opposite direction." 56 For-
mer Senator Metzenbaum also remarked on the practice's effect
on the employer-employee relationship by saying, "It devalues
workers, and breaks the bonds that have traditionally linked
workers and employers, a critical component of a high-
productivity workplace"157
It was Henry Ford's dream to enable each one of his em-
ployees to own the Model T. In the spirit of that idea, Senator
Metzenbaum also supported his bill by saying that the trend of
increased use of contingent labor "may pose a substantial risk to
the free enterprise system as a whole, because these workers
will no longer be able to purchase the very products they are
making, to buy a car or afford a mortgage, or contribute much
to the economy. In addition, the more contingent our work force
becomes, the more dependent workers will be on government
programs... "158
CONCLUSION
American workers should continue to be recognized and
counted on the basis of their employment relationship and not
merely on their presence in the workplace. The manipulation of
the American work force from stable traditional full-time posi-
tions to largely involuntary part-time arrangements has re-
sulted in a lack of protection for employees under various labor
laws. It is significant that the Supreme Court is currently ad-
dressing the split in the Federal circuits regarding whether em-
ployees should be counted under Title VII and the ADEA ac-
cording to their status on the payroll or on the job. Essentially,
the issue is one of either reafiming traditional notions of em-
tingent versus permanent positions. See generally Belous, supra note 90. For a detailed
discussion on Representative Pat Schroeder's Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protec-
tion Act, see Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Workforce Demand a
Change in Federal Policy?, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 731 (1995).
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ployer-employee relations or of abandoning the idea that em-
ployment means security for the individual and for the economy.
